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Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1974 (2/2)
[01.10.30] Mr. BUTLER. Specifically, on or about June 28, 1972, Jeb Magruder met with CRP Director of Scheduling Herbert Porter and asked him to prepare false testimony concerning the purposes for which cash had been' disbursed to Liddy. Specifically, on July 19 and 20, 1972, respectively, Porter and Magruder falsely told FBI agents that the funds obtained from CRP were for legal intelligence gathering activities. Specifically, on August 10, Porter testified falsely before the, Watergate grand jury as to the purpose of the $199,000 in cash paid to Liddy. Specifically on August 18, Magruder after discussing his false story about, the Liddy money with Dean and Mitchell, testified falsely be-- fore the Watergate grand Jury. Specifically, on September 12 or 13, 1972, Magruder met with Mitchell and Dean to plan a false certain meetings among -Mitchell, Magruder, Dean, and Liddy in early 1972, Specifically, Magruder thereafter testified about the meetings before the Watergate grand jury. Now, I would direct your attention to page 86 of our transcript of the testimony in which it shows that on March 21, during his morning meeting with Dean the President was told of' the perjury by both .Magruder and Porter. Dealing with the top of page 87, the President says, "Who?" and this deals -with something preceding it, and I won't burden you with that. It talks about Mitchell, and then Dean says: [quoted] Mitchell, I don't know how much knowledge he actually had. I know Magruder has perjured himself in the grand jury. I know that Porter has perjured himself, uh, in the grand jury. [end] And the President says, "Porter [unintelligible], who is that, in effect, and "he is one of Magruder's deputies." And the President "Yeah." Then on March 13, 1973, "Dean told the, President directly that Strachan's denial of prior knowledge of the Liddy plan was, false and that Strachan planned to stonewall again in the future. And I call your attention to page 70 of our transcript, the one prepared for the committee. Dean says: [quoted section] Well, Chapin didn't know anything about the Watergate, and-- PRESIDENT. You don't think so? ,, DEAN. No, absolutely not. PRESIDENT, Did Strachan? DEAN. Yes. PRESIDENT. He knew? DEAN. Yes. PRESIDENT. Well, then, Bob knew. He probably told Bob, then. He may not have. He may not have. DEAN. He was, he was judicious in what he relayed and, uh, but Strachan is tough as nails. PRESIDENT. What'll he say: Just go in and say he didn't know? DEAN. He'll go in and stonewall it and say, "I don't know anything about what you are talking about." He has already done it twice, as you know, in interviews. PRESIDENT. I guess he should, shouldn't lie., in the interests of--why? I suppose we can all that justice, call we? We can't call it [unintelligible]. DEAN. Well it, it-- PRESIDENT. The point is, how do you justify that? DEAN. It's a-- it's a personal loyalty with him. He doesn't want it any other way. He didn't have to be told. He didn't have to be asked, It just is something that he found is the way he wanted to handle the Situation, PRESIDENT. But he knew? He knew about Watergate? Strachan did? DEAN. Uh-huh PRESIDENT. I'll be damned. Well, that's the problem in Bob's case, isn't it? It's not Chapin then, but Strachan--'cause Strachan worked for him. DEAN. Uh-huh. [end quoted section] The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has already consumed 5 minutes. Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman. may I have 5 minutes more to speak in opposition to the motion? The CHAIRMAN. I thought the gentleman was speaking in opposition to the motion? Mr. BUTLER. I was, but I thought I was on Mr. Flowers' time, and I thought he is the. proponent of the motion. Mr. Chairman, I will take my 5 minutes wherever I may, but I would-- The CHAIRMAN. If the gentleman is seeking 5 more minutes, the gentleman will be recognized for the 5 minutes, and that will consume the 10 minutes in opposition to the amendment. Mr. BUTLER. Well, we will have to live with that, Mr. Chairman. Returning now, if I may, I would like to emphasize that the procedural aspects of these proceedings are not -without their levity, and I consider this an extremely serious matter, and there is, indeed, extensive evidence which I would, given the time, enlarge upon. I am going through my prepared remarks, and I will conclude, and I will let you know when my time has run out. But, it goes for, at this moment, some 13 pages, and it extensively develops, with specific, whatever that word is, the point which this, paragraph is addressed to, the approving the condoning, the acquiescence in and the counseling of witnesses with respect to false testimony. It is a grave matter, and I regret that we have, chosen to limit time, but I will do what I can with what I have. [01.16.04]
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Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1974 (2/2)
[01.16.04] Specifically. on March 21, 1973, the President instructed Dean and Haldeman to lie about the arrangements for payments to the defendants. And in this regard, I call your attention to page 119 of our transcript. I think we have probably been over this some little time before but it is relevant to this particular point dealing with the Cuban committee [quoted section] PRESIDENT. As far as what happened up to this time, our cover there is just going to be the Cuban Committee did this for them up to the election. DEAN. Well, yeah. We can put that together. That isn't, of course, quite the way it happened, but, uh---- PRESIDENT I know, but it's the way it's going to have to happen. DEAN. It's going to have to happen [laughs]. [end quoted section] Mr. BUTLER. And I direct Your attention also to page 120 of the transcript which follows specifically on March 21, also the President told Haldeman and Dean-- [quoted section] PRESIDENT. That's right. That's right. HALDEMAN. You can say you forgot, too, can't you? DEAN. Sure. PRESIDENT. That's right. DEAN. But you cant'-your-very high risk in perjury situation. [end quoted section] Mr. BUTLER. Now, this is on page 120 of the transcript. I think I will not burden you too much with that at the moment because I am running out of time. Specifically, the President and Dean discussed how Magruder' perjury Problem -was helpful in making him keep his story straight. And that is on page 123 of our transcripts. And Dean says to the' President: [quoted section] DEAN. Once we, once we start down any route that involves the criminal justice System-- PRESIDENT. Yeah. DEAN. You've got to have full appreciation of there's really no control over that. PRESIDENT. No, sir. DEAN. While we did, we have an amazing job of--- PRESIDENT. Yeah, I know. DEAN. Keeping the thing on the track before. PRESIDENT. Straight. DEAN. While the FBI was out there all that--and that was, uh, only', because-- PRESIDENT. Right. DEAN. I had a [unintelligible] of where they were going. PRESIDENT. [Unintelligible] right. Right. But, you haven't got that now because, everybody else is going to have a lawyer, Let's take the new grand jury. Uh, the new grand jury would call Magruder again, wouldn't it? DEAN. But, based on what information it would? For example, what happens if Dean goes in and gives a story, you know, that here is the way it all came about. It was supposed to be a legitimate operation and it obviously got off the track. I heard of these horribles. I told Haldeman that we shouldn't be involved it. PRESIDENT. Yeah, right. DEAN. Then Magruder's going to have to be called in and questioned about all those meetings again, and the like. And it begins to--again, he'll begin to change his story as to what he told the grand jury the last time. PRESIDENT. Well- DEAN. That way, he is in a perjury situation. HALDEMAN. Except that's the best leverage you've got on Jeb-is that he's got to keep his story straight or he's in real trouble. DEAN. That's right. [end quoted section] Mr. BUTLER. And of course, this conversation was between the President, Dean and Haldeman. Specifically, at the March 27 meeting between the President, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman the following discussion took place this comes from the unedited, or the edited transcripts which which have come to us from the White House. And I refer you to page 35 of that transcript if you will. [quoted section] HALDEMAN, Let's go another one. So you persuade Magruder that is that; and approach is (a) not true; I think you can probably persuade him of that; and (b) not desirable to take. So he then says, in despair, "Heck, what do I do? Here's McCord out here accusing me," McCord has flatly accused me of perjury-- he's flatly accused Dean of complicity. Dean is going to go, and Magruder knows of the fact that Dean wasn't involved, so he knows that when Dean goes down, Dean can testify as an honest man. PRESIDENT. Is Dean going to finger Magruder ? HALDEMAN. No, sir. PRESIDENT There's the other point. HALDEMAN. Dean will not finger Magruder but Dean can't either-likewise, he can't defend Magruder. PRESIDENT. Well--- HALDEMAN. Dean won't consider [unintelligible] Magruder. [reading interrupted] The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will finish his sentence. Mr. BUTLER. Well, I will finish what I was reading of the statement by Mr. Haldeman in this quotation, if I may. But Magruder then says: [quoted section] Look, if Dean goes down to the grand jury and clears himself, with no evidence against him except McCord's statement, which will not hold up, and it is not, true. Now, I go down to the grand jury, because obviously they are going to call me back, and I go to defend myself against McCord's statement, which I know is true Now I have a little tougher problem than Dean has. You are saying to me, "Don't make up a new lie to cover the old lie." What would you recommend that I do? Stay with the old lie and hope I would come out, or clean myself up and go to jail'? The President, to Haldeman. "What would you advise him to do?" [end quoted section] The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. BUTLER. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California to speak in support of the--- Mr. WIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have started from an understanding of what the language is before us to be stricken, and I want to read the operative words, at least, These are charges against the President. mind you, approving, condoning, acquiescing in and counseling witnesses with respect to giving false or misleading statements to lawfully authorized investigative officers, and so forth, including congressional proceedings, Note, if you will, that; the language is couched in terms or giving false testimony in the future. That is an important thing to remember because the perjury of Magruder and Porter occurred prior to March 17, well prior to March 17, and the., President did not learn about it until March 17, and so I ask the obvious question, can you counsel the giving of perjured testimony after it is already done? Well, the answer to that is no. The President is just learning about it, on the 17th,----- [01.22.46--TAPE OUT]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1974 (1/2)
[00.08.44] Mr. HUTCHINSON. . Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hutchinson. Mr. HUTCHINSON. I will yield additional time to Mr. Wiggins. Mr. Wiggins. Thank you, Mr. Hutchinson. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized. Mr. WIGGINS, I only wish to make one point because it has been discussed elsewhere, and that, is Mr. Haldeman had the opportunity to review tapes prior to his testimony. At that time Mr. Haldeman and the President but very few others were aware Of this taping system. Mr. Haldeman reviewed these tapes. The implication is, being placed in the minds of the committee that this was again part and parcel Of a Corrupt design so that Haldeman could tailor his testimony falsely before a grand jury. Now, that is a suspicion alone, but let me tell you that there Is another side that I think is equally defensible and that is that Mr. Haldeman reviewed that tape so as to testify truthfully to the events, thereon rather than falsely. I think that is an eminently reasonable conclusion, inconsistent with, this suspicious circumstance, and the President is entitled to the more favorable construction of that event. I merely wanted to make that observation with respect to listening to the tapes and I thank the gentleman from Michigan for permitting me to amplify it. Mr. HUTCHINSON. I thank the gentleman. Does the gentleman from Indiana desire to be recognized on this question? Mr. DENNIS. Mr.--- Mr. HUTCHINSON,, I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from Indiana. Mr. DENNIS. I will say to the gentleman from Michigan that I think my friend from California has very adequately covered this matter and I do not really think I have anything particular to add. I yield time to him if he has anything else he wants to say. Mr. WIGGINS. Mr. Hutchinson----- Mr. HUTCHINSON. I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIRMAN. The question on the motion of the gentleman from Alabama. All those in favor of the motion please signify by saying aye. [Chorus of -'ayes."] All those opposed, no, and the [Chorus of "hoes."] The CHAIRMAN. All those in favor of the motion, please signify by saying aye. [Chorus of "ayes."] The CHAIRMAN. All those opposed. [Chorus of "noes."] The CHAIRMAN. The noes appear to have it. Mr. SANDMAN. I demand a. tally of the vote. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New Jersey demands a rollcall vote. The clerk will -call the role. All those in favor of the motion please signify by saying aye. All those opposed, no. The CLERK. Mr. Donohue. Mr. DONOHUE. No. The CLERK. Mr. Brooks. Mr. BROOKS. No. The CLERK. Mr. Kastenmeier Mr. KASTENMEIER. No. The CLERK. Mr. Edwards. Mr. EDWARDS. No. The CLERK. Mr. Hungate. Mr. HUNGATE. No. The CLERK. Mr. Conyers. Mr. CONYERS. No. The CLERK. Mr. Eilberg. Mr. EILBERG. No. The CLERK. Mr. Waldie. Mr. WALDIE. No. The CLERK. Mr. Flowers. Mr. FLOWERS. Present The CLERK. Mr. Mann. Mr. MANN. No. The, CLERK. Mr. Sarbanes. Mr. SARBANES. No. The CLERK. Mr. Seiberling. Mr. SEIBERLING. No. The CLERK. Mr. Danielson. Mr. DANIELSON. No. The CLERK. Mr. Drinan. Mr. DRINAN. No. The CLERK. Mr. Rangel. Mr. RANGEL. NO. The CLERK. Ms. Jordan. Ms. JORDAN. NO. The CLERK. Mr. Thornton. Mr. THORNTON. No. The CLERK. Ms. Holtzman. Ms. HOLTZMAN. No. The CLERK. Mr. Owens. Mr. OWENS. No. The CLERK. Mr. Mezvinsky. . Mr. MEZVINSKY. No. The CLERK. Mr. Hutchinson; Mr. HUTCHINSON. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. McClory. Mr. McCLORY. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Smith. Mr. SMITH. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Sandman. Mr. SANDMAN. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Railsback. Mr. RAILSBACK. No. The CLERK. Mr. Wiggins. Mr. WIGGINS. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Dennis. Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I am quite puzzled. When the author of the, amendment votes "present" I hardly know what to do but I. vote aye. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman made up his mind rather quickly. Mr. DENNIS. I do that. The CLERK. Mr. Dennis votes, aye. Mr. Fish. Mr. FISH. No. The CLERK. Mr. Mayne. Mr. MAYNE. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Hogan Mr. HOGAN. No. The CLERK. Mr. Butler. Mr. BUTLER. No. The CLERK. Mr. Cohen. Mr. COHEN. No. The CLERK. Mr. Lott. Mr. LOTT. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Froehlich. Mr. FROEHLICH. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Moorhead. Mr. MOORHEAD. Aye The CLERK. Mr. Maraziti. Mr. MARAZITI. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Latta. Mr. LATTA. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Rodino. The CHAIRMAN. NO. The CLERK. Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. The, clerk will report. The CLERK. Twelve members have voted aye, 25 members have voted no, and 1 member has voted present. The CHAIRMAN. And the motion is not agreed to. [00.14.27]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1974 (1/2)
[00.21.03] Mr. HOGAN. I will be very pleased to do so, Mr. Chairman. If the Chair would advise me at that -point in the expiration of my time, I will conclude in midsentence and yield. May I continue? The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized. Mr. HOGAN. Mr. Gray reported this fact to Mr. Dean, that he was going to have a meeting with Helms. SO on the morning of the 28th, Ehrlichman telephoned Gray and told him to cancel the meeting with Helms because he did not want the meeting to take. place at which Helms would tell that there was no CIA involvement. Gray canceled the meeting. The same, day Gray instructed his FBI agents to go out and interview Ogarrio, and continue to try to locate Dahlberg. Also on the 28th Dean asked Walters if, even after knowing there was no CIA involvement, Dean asked Walters if the CIA could stop the FBI investigations of the Dahlberg and Ogarrio checks. Walters refused to do so. Since he could not use CIA to block the investigation, Dean then acted directly, called Gray and insisted that for national security reasons or because Of CIA interest, that Gray's instructions to interview those two men should be withdrawn. Gray did cancel the interviews. But a few days later, Gray called Walters and said that he would interview them unless CIA put into writing its objection. CIA refused to do so and Walters sent Gray a memo saying that CIA had absolutely no interest. They expressed their dissatisfaction with the way the White House, was interfering with their agencies and their concern that the President's interests were not being served by his aides. These above activities were set in motion by the President, and limited the investigatory efforts of the FBI. Now there are other problems I was going to detail but I will not be able to but I do want to call to the attention and recollection of my colleagues the conversation whereby Gray called San Clemente and got Clark MacGregor on the phone and he said to Clark "that I want to talk with the President about his aides trying to misuse"--these are Gray's words not ours-- "misuse the CIA and the FBI." A few minutes later the President called Mr. Gray and did not in any way allude to any conversation he had with Mr. MacGregor or Gray's concern and congratulated Mr. Gray for doing an outstanding job in the hijacking. Mr. Gray could not contain himself any more, he blurted out, "Mr. President, your aides are trying to destroy You. They are misusing the FBI and CIA." And then Mr. Gray testified there was a perceptible pause and the President said, "Go on With your aggressive investigation, Pat." He did not even inquire about this involvement of his aides trying to misuse the FBI and the CIA. I only wish I had another hour to detail more specifies in this area but unfortunately, I do not and I will yield to the gentleman from California, Mr. Danielson. Mr. DANIELSON. Mr. chairman at this point I -wish to save time but in support of my amendment to include congressional committees, I wish to reefer to and by this reference incorporate the comments I made this morning at the time of the amendment and also my comments made on the day before yesterday, July 25, with respect to the House Committee on Banking 'and Currency. There is further evidence in support of such activities with respect to the Senate select committee and this committee and I also incorporate them by reference. Due to the shortage, of time I yield to my brother, Father Drinan. Mr. HOGAN. I think I still have the time but I will be happy to yield to the Congressman form from Massachusetts Mr. DRINAN. Thank you very much. I want to point out the necessity of retaining this section because it deals with something very fundamental, that by Federal law, any person who influences or seeks to influence or intimidates or impedes any witness in any proceeding, commits a crime. Let us take the summer of John Dean during that particular year. On June 21 he is assigned to this case and he sits first of all, with Mr. Gray and the FBI people at every single interview when people from White House go before the FBI. Is Mr. Dean seeking to influence or intimidate or impede? He happens to be the President's counsel. And all of the people who saw Dean there, -who knew, recognized that this is most unusual, especially after the President on the very day after Mr. Dean was assigned, said that the White House has had no involvement whatsoever in Watergate and the President's counsel is there on the phone, day after day, for 2 long weeks with Mr. Patrick Gray. Well, Dean and Ehrlichman really could write a book on how to be a double agent of the FBI. Did he seek to--did he succeed in influencing? That is not the question. The offense is done even if he endeavors to influence. Mr. Dean was before this committee. I cannot imagine him intimidating but he can influence and he can impede and he was very successful. [00.26.20]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1974 (1/2)
[00.31.41] Mr. SANDMAN. But let us get back again to the most important thing of them all. Why are these' people resisting so hard to give us nine simple sentences? Why'? They do not have to give us great big volumes. They do not have to give us 150 pages that Mr'. Doar referred to. Just give us nine simple, sentences. The simple reason they will not--they do not have the proof, They have 40 books, but no witnesses. An unusual case, to say the least. Now, we can talk about this as long as we want, but I think we have talked long enough. I will yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from California , or Mississippi, I am so sorry, Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Sandman. Just a couple of points. First of all, with reference to this telephone conversation between the President and Pat Gray ray, the fact is Pat Gray did not initiate that -call. The President called Mr. Gray at approximately 8:25 a.m. .July 6. This all came about apparently through MacGregor and MacGregor did not meet with the President until 10 a.m. A lot has been said about what was said in that conversation. After Gray raised the question that the President's staff was trying to mortally wound the, President what did the President do? He paused perceptibly, and I think this is a natural--it shows logically that this was a matter of first impression and concern and he did not make any kind of comments about coverup. he told him, you just keep going right ahead with your thorough investigation, or some words to that effect. Now there, is no hard evidence that the President ever attempted to interfere with the course of the FBIs investigation. At no time did he, Haldeman or Ehrlichman state that the investigation should be halted--and I refer you to book 2, page 383. They merely expressed a, concern, -and a legitimate one, I think, at that time that the trail not lead to exposure of CIA or Plumbers' activities which would harm national interest. And this is important. Before and after that concern was expressed there was no knowledge or no involvement by the President in the future attempts to limit the investigation. There is no evidence that the, theory, this Watergate break-in was a CIA operation, was discussed before Gray told Dean the FBI was considering this possibility on June 22. Although Gray had checked with Helms before talking to Dean and received a tentative denial, it does not appear that he passed this information on to Dean. I refer you to book 2, page 339. Therefore there. is no evidence that the President was aware of CIA denial at the time he was informed of possible CIA involvement. Now, it is very difficult to argue to these specifies that we are being given, we hear them for the first time. here and there are replies to these, but we have to try to go and find the reply on the spur of the moment. It is important to differentiate, I think, between the President President's expressed concern and the subsequent actions taken by his assistants without his knowledge. Once again You must look at whether this the assistants, the aides, doing these, things, or the President. Mr. HOGAN. Will. the gentleman yield? Mr. LOTT. I think Mr. Wiggins---- The CHAIRMAN. There are 3 1/2 minutes remaining out of the 10 minutes. Mr. Wiggins is recognized Mr. WIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be succinct. It is instructive to remember. ladies and gentlemen, that in the form of this article we are talking about Presidential misconduct, Presidential misconduct, and not misconduct of others unless it con be logically and appropriately tied to the President. I wish to speak rather rapidly to the matter of CIA. There. are two Presidential acts within the time frame of June 23 to July 6, and that is the time frame in which it is alleged there has been inference with the CIA. The first act begins when the President issued these instructions, as reported in our tab. The President Instructed H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman to insure that the FBI investigation of Watergate did not expose unrelated CIA covert activities or White House special investigative unit activities, and that the CIA and the FBI should coordinate to that end. That is a Presidential act and it is admitted. The only other Presidential act occurred on July 6, several wee later, and this is what the President said after being informed by Pat Gray that his aides are attempting to mortally wound the President. The President said, "Pat, You just continue. to conduct your aggressive investigation." [00.36.29]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1974 (1/2)
[00.36.29] Mr. WIGGINS. Now, some sinister purpose is imputed because he paused briefly before he said that. But that is what he said. Now, I want to refresh the recollection of the members as to whether or not the President's concern about CIA was justified under all of the circumstances, We remember that McCord was in fact arrested and a former CIA agent, We remember that Barker was in fact arrested and a former CIA agent, perhaps an active CIA agent, Martinez was arrested and he was a former CIA agent. Hunt's name was in the Washington Post: Hunt was a spy for the United States, a former CIA agent, and a former member of the Plumbers' unit. There are other facts which were called to the President's attention on June 23 all of which indicate possible CIA involvement a theory which was Supported by the FBI itself the FBI itself believed there might be CIA involvement, Given those facts, ladies and gentlemen, we are asked to conclude that the President corruptly, corruptly, instructed his aides to request, that there be coordination between the CIA and the FBI so as not to reveal unrelated CIA covert activities: Now, ladies and gentlemen, that is all the evidence there is in between the 23d Of June and the 6th of July. There is no question that John Dean acted improperly. I am willing to stipulate to that. But that does not execute the President's instructions which were given on the 23d of June. On that issue. ladies and gentleman, the question really is not all that close. I would think that the weight if not the preponderance, of the evidence in favor of the President is that he acted in the public, interest as distinguished from corruptly. Surely however, there is not a clear and convincing showing that the President acted corruptly- given the facts and the knowledge that he had at the time he issued the instruction. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. All time hs expired. The question now occurs on the motion of the gentleman from Alabama. All those in favor of the motion please say aye. [Chorus of "ayes".] The CHAIRMAN. All those opposed, no, [Chorus of "noes."] The CHAIRMAN. The noes have it. Mr. SANDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I demand a rollcall. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New Jersey demands a rollcall, and the clerk will call the roll. All those in favor, signify by saying aye; all those opposed, no. The CLERK. Mr. Donohue. Mr. DONOHUE. No. The CLERK. Mr. Brooks. Mr. BROOKS. No. The CLERK. Mr. Kastenmeier. Mr. KASTENMEIER. NO. The CLERK. Mr. Edwards, Mr. EDWARDS. NO. The CLERK. Mr. Hungate. Mr. HUNGATE. No. The CLERK. Mr. Conyers. Mr. CONYERS. No. The CLERK. Mr. Eilberg Mr. EILBERG. No. The CLERK. Mr. Waldie. Mr. WALDIE. No. The CLERK. Mr. Flowers. Mr. FLOWERS. Present. The CLERK. Mr. Mann. Mr. MANN. No. The CLERK. Mr. Sarbanes. Mr. SARBANES. No. The CLERK. Mr. Seiberling Mr. SEIBERLING. No. The, CLERK. Mr. Danielson. Mr. DANIELSON. No. The CLERK. Mr. Drinan. Mr. DRINAN. No. The CLERK. Mr. Rangel. Mr. RANGEL. NO. The, CLERK. Ms. Jordan. Ms. JORDAN. NO, The CLERK. Mr. Thornton, Mr. THORNTON. ]NO. The CLERK. Ms. Holtzman. Ms. HOLTZMAN. NO. The CLERK. Mr. Owens. Mr. OWENS. No. The CLERK. Mr. Mezvinsky Mr. MEZVINSKY. No. The CLERK. Mr. Hutchinson. Mr. HUTCHINSON. Ave. The CLERK. Mr. McClory. Mr. McCLORY. No. The CLERK. Mr. Smith. Mr. SMITH. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Sandman. Mr. SANDMAN. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Railsback. Mr. RAILSBACK. No The. CLERK. Mr. Wiggins. Mr. WIGGINS. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Dennis. Mr. DENNIS. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Fish. Mr. FISH. No. The CLERK. Mr. Mayne. Mr. MAYNE. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Hogan. Mr. HOGAN. No. The CLERK. Mr. Butler. Mr. BUTLER . No. The CLERK. Mr. Cohen. Mr. COHEN. No. The CLERK. Mr. Lott. Mr. LOTT. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Froehlich. Mr. FROEHLICH. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Moorhead. Mr. MOORHEAD. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Maraziti. Mr. MARAZITI. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Latta. Mr. LATTA. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. RODINO. Mr. RODINO/ NO. The CHAIRMAN. The clerk will report. The CLERK. Mr. Chairman 11 members. have voted aye. 26 members have, voted no, I member voted present. The CHAIRMAN. And the motion is not agreed to. [00.41.34]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1974 (1/2)
[00.46.13] Mr. RANGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition. The CHAIRMAN. If the gentleman will defer, the gentleman from Alabama has to ask unanimous consent. Mr. FLOWERS. I regret I passed over the most important thing I ask unanimous consent that the debate on this motion of mine be limited to 20 minutes, with 10 minutes going to the, proponents and 10 minutes to the opponents of the. motion, The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered, and the gentleman from New York. Mr. RANGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I rise to support this paragraph No. 7 which deals with charging the President with disseminating information received from officers of the, Department of Justice of the United States to subjects of the investigation conducted by lawfully authorized investigative officers and employees of the Untied States for the purpose of aiding and assisting such subjects and in their attempts to avoid criminal liability. This is merely to suggest that one of the, most sacred institutions that we have in this country is the proceedings which take, place in the grand jury. It shocks my sensitivity to hear certain members of this Committee' indicate that an inference is drawn because the President shares information that he receives from the Acting Attorney General -with people that he knows are, being, investigated for possible indictment, where the Acting Attorney General has indicated that these people would be Indicted, that we can Say that the President' shared grand jury information with these people that we should draw two inferences One inference is that the President would want them to he and conform their story to one that would avoid liability, and one of the members suggested that we should consider the fact that that. perhaps in this particular instance the President wanted one of his' men to tell the truth. I submit that regardless of which one of these two the. President was suggesting, it was violating the secret, information which should have remained in the grand jury and should never have been shared in the first instance with the President. And the President should never have used this information regardless of for what purpose to share with other people. This is especially so when he went out of his -way to tell Henry Petersen that he -was going to keep that information confidential. But, this is all a part of a plan.. Most of you recall on March 21 when John Dean came to the, President to talk about the cancer that was growing in the White House that the President again recalled exactly what he, was being told on his Dictaphone and the President knew the people in the, White House had started this conspiracy rolling. Of course, at that time it was merely to gather political intelligence. The President had remembered some of the, political intelligence because CRP would give it to Magruder, Magruder would give it, to Strachan, Strachan would give it to Haldeman. and Haldeman has discussed it with the President and we have that on a tape. Now just where do you get political intelligence from your opponents? The record is very clear, because. the President responds, "Are we bugging -Muskie are we. bugging McGovern" and the, inference which I draw "or it just the DNC." Now, I don't know how the President would expect they would get this information because you are only a burglar if you get caught, and so when the President asked information of the Attorney General, and he directed Ehrlichman to tell Kleindienst that no White House personnel had prior knowledge of the break-in, it was strange how one, member said yesterday well, they didn't have prior knowledge. Well, in other words, I will accept what the member said. I don't really believe that Liddy and Hunt called the President of the United States and said we are going to bit on June 17. I do believe, however that Ehrlichman knew that, Haldeman knew, that Mitchell knew that, they had, gotten enough money together for' Liddy and Hunt. Liddy was transferred off the White House payroll to go to work for CRP. Hunt, still had his office in the White House, and Mr. Kleindienst, who is supposed to be receiving this report for the first time, saw the head of the burglary on the golf course, and he never told the FBI. So, the scenario which one member said, it's true they never had prior knowledge that the only knowledge people in the White House did not know was when they were going to hit. But, they certainly knew when they got information whether they were in San Clemente, whether they were in Washington, D.C. or whether or not they were in Key Biscayne, that. Liddy and Hunt were the people. As a matter of fact, the President says on one of the tapes that we received that he immediately suspected Colson. Let's find out what the plan is. Most of you heard that, it was suggested to Mr. Mitchell. He was the new plan, as Martha clearly pointed out, that they felt that if they could deliver Mr. Mitchell, then perhaps it would keep away from the White House and keep it away from the Presidency. I do not know why people insist that you read the whole paragraph after you talk about the stonewall and plead the fifth amendment, because the President is saying he would rather do it another way if it is going to come out at all. But, the President concludes to read the bottom line that whether you stonewall, cover up, and save the. plan, the last thing that he said to Mr. Mitchell is that: "You know, lip to' this point, the whole theory has been containment, and you know that, John, but they are shifting now, and the important thing is to protect the people. The important thing is to go to the grand jury, get the information and report back to those people who are the suspects by Henry Petersen." The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has consumed 5 minutes. I will recognize the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Mayne, for 5 minutes. [00.52.50]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1974 (1/2)
[00.58.28] Mr. MAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [quoting] QUESTION. And you testified, however, that had it, in fact, been technically grand jury testimony that., in your legal opinion, you had a perfect right to transmit it to the President? Is that right? ANSWER. Yes, sir. QUESTION. Arid I think you testified also that had it, in fact, also been grand jury testimony that in your legal opinion it would be entirely proper, correct and legal for the President, in the discharge of his administrative function in determining whether or not to fire Haldeman and Ehrlichman what he should do about them and so on, to inform them of the charges against them, is that correct? [end quoted section] ANSWER. Yes, sir. Now, similar answers were given by this distinguished public servant and to a number of Congressmen who questioned him on the subject, it seems clear that much ado is being made about nothing in this particular paragraph insofar as it related to the testimony that the President did transmit information received from Mr. Petersen. Mr. RANGEL. Would the gentleman yield'? Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman Mr. MAYNE. I yield back my time to Mr. Dennis. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Indiana is recognized for the remainder of the time---3 minutes. Mr. DENNIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Mayne has made my speech for me and made it very well. I am very happy that he recalled that colloquy that I had with Mr. Petersen and called it to our attention, because it is the answer. Mr. Petersen said in the first place that it was not grand jury testimony although some of it was, some of it wasn't. In the second place, if it had all been grand jury testimony he would have had a, perfect right to tell the President of the United States about it, as he, did. In the third place, the President of the United States had a perfect right to take up with these people the general subject matter with which they were charged for his administrative purposes and in order to determine whether or not they ought to be fired or retained, and "I expected him to do that when I talked to him." And there was not anything illegal about it. Now, that is the Petersen testimony. And now we are going, to hang somebody because of that transaction when that is the man involved has to say about it and it- is very, very difficult to see. Mr. Petersen has no complaint and I would not think that this committee would have any complaint either. Now, that is adequately covered and I hope everyone here understanding exactly the procedure we are going through. Yesterday we gave these people a little hard time because they would not file an ordinary charge which as Mr. Latta said, would be granted to any jaywalker in the land. So today the have concocted a scenario and we have a series Of motions which nobody intends to vote for, even including the charming gentleman who makes them, just so they can talk about Specifies that they were not willing to plead. That is all right. It is good, clean fun, I guess. A little bit farcical, I think, for such a serious Procedure. I am afraid some of the bias against the President is showing here and there in this kind of an operation. I am afraid so, but really there is not very much more to say about this particular charge because the man who was involved and whose information was supposed to be transferred has no complaint and. said that it was perfectly 'all right. I think the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Sandman, wanted Me to yield to him, and I will be happy to do so. Mr. SANDMAN. Thank you. My only Purpose in seeking this 1 minute is, I have a question for my friend from Alabama. On my motion to strike, you voted no, On' the second one, of course, we had no vote. On three and four, you only voted present. Five and six, we had no vote. NOW, On seven, I am Curious: Are, you going to vote for your own amendment or are you going to Continue to call on people to defeat your amendment? The CHAIRMAN. the time of the--- Mr. FLOWERS./ Mr. Chairman, may I answer the question? Mr. SANDMAN. Could I have unanimous consent to have the gentleman answer? The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. [01.02.58] [DEADPAN] MR. FLOWERS. Well, the caliber of the debate is so outstanding, Mr. Sandman, that it leaves me undecided at the conclusion. [cut to SANDMAN laughing] [DISORDER in the room] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order and I think it is important that we try to maintain some decorum in this chamber. The gentleman from Illinois is recognized for 5 minutes. MR. RAILSBACK. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, we have spoken to this issue before and I regret the need to have to go back into it. But, I guess this is what we have decided to do today. Let me just say that I think the American people, if they want to suitably apprise themselves of the facts surrounding the events of April 15, ought to get ahold of the transcripts and look at them. The two preceding speakers forgot to relate a couple, of important events. The President of the United States, who was interested in finding out about the involvement of Haldeman and Ehrlichman his two top aides, had specifically assured Henry Petersen, the new----- [01.04.16--TAPE OUT]
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