Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974 (1/2)
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974 (1/2)
[00.51.09] Mr. EDWARDS. But that is the fact. I think it is really more important to point out -what was done with the information that resulted from these taps. Mr. Hoover, the Director of the FBI, would send them to the White House, to the President. There was a total from 1969 to 1971--and they went on for more than 2 years--of 104 summaries sent. And what happened? It was found that there had been no leaks of confidential information from these 104 summaries. Nobody went, to jail, nobody was charged , nobody lost their job , nobody was transferred. There were six or seven members of the National Security Council who had their telephones tapped. Four newsman later were tapped, and several White House employees, Most of these people, had no access to any confidential information -whatsoever. And as I pointed out earlier, these summaries indicated that no leaks were going on. Well, how was this information used by the White House? On December 29, 1969, Mr. Hoover wrote to the President and said that former Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, was about, to write, an article for Life. magazine attacking Mr. Nixon on his handling of the Vietnam war, and part of Mr. Clifford's attack was to be regarding Nixon's criticism of President Thieu. Well. immediately this triggered political action by the White House. Presidential assistant, Butterfield wrote Magruder: "The name of the game, of course, is to springboard ourselves into position from which -we can effectively Counter whatever Clifford takes." The suggestion suggested method of countering Clifford's article was sent by Haldeman, the chief political adviser to President Nixon, and included a proposed discrediting of Clifford by use of his prior statements or a counterarticle. Haldeman directed Magruder to be ready to act and suggested finding methods of free action. 'Mr. Haldeman concluded "the key now is how to lay groundwork and be ready to go, and let's act.,' Mr. Ehrlichman characterized the Clifford information as "the kind of early warning we need more of," and he, noted to Mr. Haldeman, "your game planners are now in excellent position to map anticipatory action. The basic nature of the material developed from these 17 wiretaps and sent to the, White House, was political and personal. There were no leaks. The FBI was sending what the White House wanted, and certainly the flow of the information was not, stopped by the White House when the character of the material became, obvious. The material, in addition to the political information on Clark Clifford, contained reports On how certain Senators were expected to vote on legislation, on the activities of critics of the administration's administrative agencies, on the campaign plans of Senator Muskie. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. EDWARDS. Could I have 3 more minutes, please, -Mr. Chairman, of the 20 minutes? The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has consumed 4 minutes Mr. EDWARDS. Four minutes, and I will take 2. The CHAIRMAN The gentleman in is recognized for 2 more minutes. Mr. EDWARDS. And information on the social habits and political plans of White House employees. The material had no conceivable relevance to national security, but only could have had political value. I personally reviewed many of these summaries that the FBI sent to the President describing, what was Said over the home telephones of these people under surveillance, and I want to be careful not to describe any of the information in such a way that could get back or be traced to the. people Involved. Suffice 'It to say the conversations were those of citizens, their wives, their children, chatting on the telephone With acquaintances and close friends, confiding their joys, their' sorrows, their anxieties about their personal lives, and in some instances their observations about political and. social events of the United States. These telephone calls were like any calls between close friends where personal disclosures were made, only for the ears at the Other end of the line, and Some of the information would be terribly embarrassing if it, were heard by third parties. The summaries themselves are the strongest evidence of the wisdom of Mr. Justice Holmes' description of wiretapping as "a dirty business." The President authorized these wiretaps. He did not stop it, when they almost immediately proved to be nonproductive. He. knew about them. He discussed them with John Dean on February 28, 1973. He was talking about two of the men who were being tapped, and he said to John Dean, "Incidentally, didn't Muskie do anything had on these? To share with you how the FBI felt about it, this is what two agents said in a memorandum on October 20, 1971. They were talking about why there were no regular records kept of these tapes by the FBI. This is what the two FBI agents said: it goes without saying that knowledge of this coverage represents a potential source of tremendous embarrassment to the Bureau and political disaster for the Nixon administration. Copies of the material itself could be used for political blackmail and ruination of Nixon, Mitchell, and others. [00.56.55]