Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 26, 1974 (1/2)
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 26, 1974 (1/2)
[00.34.38] The CHAIRMAN. I recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Railsback, for 5 minutes. Mr. RAILSBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Doar, in response to a question put it to you by Congressman Flowers, you indicated that it was the intent of the staff in its report to specifically document, with evidence and with references to the, particular subparagraphs of each article. Is that right? Mr. DOAR. That is correct. Mr. RAILSBACK.. Will that documentary statement be submitted to us for our consideration, to each individual? Mr. DOAR. Well, that is the judgment of the committed, Congressman Mr. RAILSBACK. I take it it is going to go into the report and I take it that we will have a right to either provide separate views or dissenting views or minority views? Mr. DOAR. I am certain there is no question about that. The CHAIRMAN. Might the Chair interject that since this is not a matter for counsel to decide, but this is a question of policy that has been pursued by the House of Representatives, every member has a right to submit additional views. The views would not be the, views of the staff. The views would be the views of the committee. The committee would report and not the counsel. Counsel would not be writing the report. The report would be written by the committee. Mr. RAILSBACK. I hope that didn't come out of my time, but I thank You for the explanation. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized for extra time. Mr. RAILSBACK. Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, that I personally at this point in time think that perhaps it is a good idea to have a motion to strike on each of those counts so that those of us that are Concerned about the various allegations have a right to submit our beliefs and our concerns. And this particular paragraph, which is item one in the Sarbanes substitute and has to do with false and misleading information, happens to be, as everyone knows, one of my major areas of concern. In, drafting your report, it would seem to me that you would want to consider a conversation that took place on March 27, 1973, when the President instructed Ehrlichman to meet with Attorney General Kleindienst and tell him that, Dean was not involved, had no prior knowledge, and that neither Haldeman, Ehrlichman or Colson had prior knowledge, but there was a serious question being raised about Mitchell. It is my belief that this is the time they were going to set Mitchell up. On the following day, Ehrlichman telephoned Kleindienst and executed the President's instructions. He relayed the President's assurance that there -was no White House involvement in the break-in; but that serious questions were being raised with regard to Mitchell. This happened following the famous March 21 conversation, when John Dean -went into some detail to involve Ehrlichman, Haldeman, himself, Magruder and Porter. Then I think I would go to the Series Of events that took place in mid-April, which was after John Dean decided to blow the whistle on April 8, followed by Magruder on April 13, followed by LaRue, on I think the 14th, when he said the jig was up. And then finally, Silbert called Henry Petersen. Petersen in turn got in touch with Attorney General Kleindienst, Kleindienst in turn got in touch with the President and meetings were arranged between Henry Petersen, and the President. The President met with Henry Petersen on April 16,1973, from 1:39 to 3:25. At this meeting, the President promised to treat as confidential any information disclosed by Petersen to the President. This was at a time when Kleindienst had decided to recuse himself. In other words, because of his close association with John Mitchell and others. he decided it was not proper for him to lead the Watergate investigation, and this job was assigned to Henry Petersen. The President emphasized to Petersen that "you are talking only to me and there is not going to be anybody else on the White House staff In other words, I am acting counsel and everything else." The President suggested that the only explanation might be to dig more. When Petersen expressed some reservation about information being disclosed to Moore, the President said "let's just--better it with me." At that meeting, the President, or Petersen supplied the President With a memorandum which he had requested on April 15. the day before, summarizing the existing evidence that implicated Haldeman Ehrlichman and Strachan. Then there was a, telephone conversation later that same day, April 16, and in my opinion, this is even more clear. The President, when talking to Petersenm, asked him if there were any new developments that be should know about, and he reassured Petersen, "Of course, anything you tell me, as I think I told you earlier will not be passed on, because, I know the rules of the grand jury. Petersen then recounted to the, President the developments of that day on the Watergate investigation. The following morning, on April 17, the President met with Haldeman, somebody who had been implicated, both by Dean on March 21, and also implicated by Henry Petersen. Early in the meeting President relayed Dean's disclosures -which had been given to him by Henry Petersen, the Special Prosecutor. The President also told Haldeman that the money issue was critical. And I quote. "Another thing, if you could get John and yourself," referring to John Ehrlichman, in my opinion, "to sit down and do some hard thinking about what kind of strategy you are going to have with the money, you know what I mean." The, CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois has expired. [00.40.46]