August 3, 1994 - Part 6
August 3, 1994 - Part 6
(17:35:38) Mr. EGGLESTON. Well, let me try. You've raised a number of different issues. Let me see if I can touch on each of them. 120 My sense of this when I say that it was a-let me start this way. I did not think, I'm only one person who talked to Mr. Nussbaum, but I did not think that Mr. Nussbaum intended to affect the out. come of whatever it was that the RTC was going to decide. I never had that feeling. He had a personal problem with Ellen Kulka. She's been described as tough. It is fair to say that he thought that she was unreasonably tough. I don't know how much this Committee knows about the Kaye, Scholer matter, but from Mr. Nussbaum's perspective and from the perspective of most of the Bar that practiced against the OTS and the RTC, the decisions involving that law firm were all but extor. tion, that the OTS had all but shut down the law firm. In order to extort $40 million out of the law firm. That was the perception, and that this Committee will probably remember, I can't remember whether there were hearings after that or not. But there were certainly sort of seminars all around the country. He thought she was unreasonably tough. He had-my sense of this is that he had a personal problem with Ellen Kulka. I did not particularly think-and you can ask him and ask others-I did not particularly think that anybody else in the White House shared that. She was his opponent in a very bitter litigation. Very bitter litigation. And I think that he had a bitter reaction to her arising out of litigation. It was personal, but I think it was personal to Bernie Nussbaum. I do not think-I didn't hear anybody else in the White House say anything about Ellen Kulka or particularly care about Ellen Kulka- This, to me-and again, you'll talk to others, I can just give you my perception, this was a Bernie Nussbaum issue arising out of a litigation that he had had. I did not think that he had intended to affect the outcome. He had a real problem with her because he thought her judgment was bad in that particular matter. I do not think and I did not think that he thought somehow that by having- I did not think that he thought that the outcome would be different if Mr. Altman remained in his position. And I think that's true for a number of different reasons. One is that Mr. Altman said it. The second is that it's pretty clear to anybody in Washington and I think it was clear to me, at least at the time, if Mr. Altman had done anything whatsoever, anything whatsoever to interfere with the decision that Mr. Ryan and Ms. Kulka made, I think Ms. Kulka told you she wouldn't be at the RTC anymore. And I think we can imagine that she would do more than slip quietly into the night . I thought as a practical matter this "de facto recusal"--this was real, this was real even if Mr. Altman didn't want to do it, But I did not think that Mr. Nussbaum thought that there was going to be alteration in the outcome as a result of it. That was-that's just my perception at the time. You're going to ask others. The CHAIRMAN. Well, you know this is pregant for follow-up, but we're so far over the time I'm reluctant to do that. If we do-- Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, I'll even give up some of my next,: time or something. Could I just have the privilege of making a 30- second comment? The CHAIRMAN. Let me inquire on this side. Senator BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I intend to follow this up as well, but I would be delighted to have. 121 Senator KERRY. Just a follow-up. Senator DAMATO. By the way, if I might make an observation, Mr. Chairman. It is moments like these that I think are important and I understand why the Chair ruled that we should give 10 minutes to our colleagues, the latitude to pursue a line of questioning. And I'm happy to yield to the gentleman. Senator KERRY. I don't want to play by any special rules, Senator DAMATO. I don't think it's a special rule. I think it's comity and I'm delighted. Senator KERRY- Let me say in fairness, and I say to my colleagues, I think the answer is a very important answer and a legitimate answer, but I'm even surprised that there isn't more statement. I think my colleagues have to be fair to understand that the White House was operating with the perception of an RTC that had already leaked and they had a perception of conceivable abuse here. In addition, there was a process of a demand for recusals going on that had no basis on legality or ethical standards. And so I think we have to really understand the dynamics and the full flavor of what was happening. And I simply want to say I think that when you do you begin to understand this a little bit better in fairness to what happened. eThe CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Eggleston, you wanted to add a point and I'll let you do that.