August 3, 1994 - Part 3
August 3, 1994 - Part 3
(12:50:19) Senator MURRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Murray. 54 Mr. Secretary, there's one other item I want to cover with you and then we may be near finishing, depending upon what Senator D'Amato wants to raise. I want to just quickly review with you the history of this recusal matter with Mr. Altman because it's very important and you were at least involved in aspects of that as it unfolded. Let me tell you what's in our Committee record so that you have a clear frame of reference here. Mr. Altman had a meeting with you and Ms. Hanson on February 1st where he was thinking aloud about what he ought to do and you have expressed the view that that was going to have to be his decision. His testimony-and it's undisputed- is that he had reached the decision, that he was leaning in the direction of recusal, and that that was his state of mind and that he had not made a final decision on that, he was going to sort of weigh that, he was seeking your advice, presumably, and the advice of others. Then he went to the meeting at the White House on the 2nd, the very fateful meeting. He testified last night in the middle of the night that sometime after he left your office and before he got into that meeting at the White House on the 2nd, he actually did make the decision to recuse himself. So he went into the meeting and in the course of the meeting, he declared that intention. Well, now what we have in the way of testimony as to what followed, probably the most useful guidance we have, in addition to what Mr. Altman confirmed last night, are the diary entries of your Chief of Staff, Josh Steiner, because he took- he put notes down based on what he had been told by Mr. Altman after that meeting. Mr. Altman also gave us some of the flavor of that last night. And the bottom line is that Mr. Nussbaum, particularly, didn't like the sound of Mr. Altman's decision to recuse himself, and so, in some manner, he expressed himself forcefully-and you can get the full flavor of it in terms of your Chief of Staff 's diary notes on that and what happened was that it obviously had enough of an impact on Mr. Altman that he decided that he'd better sleep on it, despite the fact that he walked in with the intention of-had made the decision to recuse himself. So he slept on it overnight and the next day decided that he wouldn't recuse himself and apparently on that next day, if my recollection is right, he spoke with you and indicated that he had now reached the judgment that he would not, at least for the time being, recuse himself. Now, that's what the record is. We don't have anybody disputing that chain of events. Now, the feel of that and the look of that, I think, is troubling. Because here you have a fellow going over to the White House, he says he's made up his mind, he goes in, the President's lawyer, in terms of the Institutional Office of the Presidency, his lawyer is there, doesn't like it, really applies some form of pressure-and you should read the words in Josh Steiner's diary in terms of the flavor of what, the intensity of it-and Altman gets turned around here and he changes his mind and then he stays in that status for some period of time. terms of when he decides to Now, there's an end to the story in recuse and how he decides to recuse and so forth. One of the concerns that I have and I think you have to think about as well 55 I mean, I think every senior officer of the Government has to think about this who has any relationship to this and just is a citizen as well-and that's the appropriateness and the propriety of Mr. Nussbaum in that capacity, in effect, trying to strong-arm Mr. Altman out of his decision. Now, I find that troubling. My question to you would be, is that the way things ought to work? Is that a proper action for Mr. Nussbaum to be taking in this situation?