August 2, 1994 - Part 11
August 2, 1994 - Part 11
(01:00:47) Senator D'AMATO. OK. Mr. Altman, I want to take you back to February 24. I'm having trouble understanding some things, but maybe not. I'll tell you why. When you were preparing for this hearing, recognizing that the issue of recusal would be brought up, and I talked to you about it the night before, can you tell us why you didn't mention that recusal on the 24th when it was written down in your briefing book? Did Ms. Hanson tell you not to mention the Feb ruary. 2 discussions about recusal? Mr. First of all, Senator, I wasn't asked about recusalYou told me the night before you were going to ask me about it and I don't believe you did. Second, the question I answered from Senator Gramm and maybe I didn't I do the best job answering it but 543 that's what--I tried to do my best, I took to mean communication relating to the RTC investigation of Madison. Now, I've said many times, and I'll say it again, don't think that recusal had any bearin at all on the RTC investigation of Madison. genator DAMATO. You did spend that February 2 meeting, probably the most contentious part of it or the only contentious part, centered around recusal; is that true? Mr. ALTMAN. I think the facts demonstrate that that discussion bad no impact, could not have had any impact. Senator DAMATO. I'm not suggesting that. Mr. ALTMAN. But we could have had a contentious discussion About anything We could have had a contentious discussion about the weather. Senator DAMATO. OK, Mr. Altman. Let me move on. On March 1, Mr. Podesta calls you and he discusses with you our testimony. He suggests to you that it's not accurate and then he specifically goes into the area. He says, "I think that we were concerned, we thought that, whether or not it fit within the frame of his characterization at the meeting as being procedural, there would be a reaction to a further disclosure at the subject of recusal came up, and that it may be best to supplement the record." Now, you then went on. I mean, is that a fair---this is Mr. Podesta's deposition. Lees continue. On March 2, and you've indicated in an effort to correct the record, after Mr. Podesta called you, you write a letter and that letter fails to mention the February 2 recusal discussion. Now did Ms. Hanson advise you not to include that? Mr. ALTMAN. No, Senator, she didn't. If I can Senator D'AMATO. How is it that in light of Mr. Podesta specifically calling this to your attention and saying to you that within the frame of this, of the meeting, that there would be a reaction to further disclosure and he really was incisive, you might say, because when we find out thereafter that there was this pressure and I think Mr. Kerry'. my colleague from Massachusetts, said it, I think here you are in the situation where you don't want to be, but you are and we have to ask why are people putting you in this position? And then we have to say to ourselves well, you made it clear you wanted to recuse yourself You made it clear to maybe half a dozen people. To your former assistant who writes a book and says that this is torturous, it's incredible and then others, Jean Hanson the Treasury General Counsel-Ms.-the counsel there, what's her name? Kulka, Kulka. I mean, they all tell you recuse Yourself. You go over there, Bernie Nussbaum-here, let me tell you, you're a tough New Yorker, you negotiate 24, 48 hours, you make deals. You didn't get here and become a great investment banker because you didn't have the stamina, intellect, and the capacity to stand up. He basically says, hey wait a minute, we don't want to leave this with Kulka. He says that, it's undisputed. He's worried about her.