August 2, 1994 - Part 11
August 2, 1994 - Part 11
(00:30:33) Senator BOXER. As a point of information for the Senator, I read that question and if you care, I can read it back to you. 'You took no action to stop the hiring of Republican Jay Stephens as Outside Counsel of the RTC; is that correct?" Senator GRAMM. And Mr. Altman, as I recall, said yes or that's correct. The point is he couldn't take action because he didn't know about the hiring, and I didn't want him to be incorrect. Senator BOXER. He was told by Mr. Stephanopoulos. Mr. ALTMAN. Senator, the question was, did I take any action to stop it, and the answer is no. Senator GRAMM. But the implication, Mr. Altman, was that you could have. Senator Boxer was giving you a litany of the things you had done and Senator KERRY. You know, I don't think we're going to edify anybody with this exchange. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Faircloth. Senator FAIRCLOTH. I had some questions to you concerning Mr. Fiske, but they'll bold. I am going to yield my time to Senator Do menici. Senator DOMENICI. Thank you very much. That's probably because I'm the oldest one here. Senator DODD. Pull the microphone closer to you. Senator FAIRCLOTH. Not chronologically. Senator DOMENICI. Mr. Altman, lees see, you have been telling us that you didn't recuse yourself on February 2, but you dig recuse yourself on February 25. Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, sir. Senator DOMENICI. I get the impression that you're trying to lead us to believe that there is no real difference between your recusing yourself on February 2 and your recusing yourself on February 25, and I think there is a big difference. In fact, I think the difference between those two dates, of your recusal on February 2 or recusal on February 25, is all the difference in this whole situation, so let me tell you why I think that. On February 25, there was no imminent decision to be made in the Madison/Whitewater case, no imminent decision to be made. On February 2, when the White House exerted and I quote from one of the witnesses, "intense pressure," the situation was dramatically different, Mr. Altman because on February 2, the White House and you both understood that within 3 weeks, either the statute would expire and Whitewater would soon be a distant memory or someone would have to make a decision to bring the case or seek a tollinge agreement. February was the critical time. The White House unde rstood. Bernard Nussbaum understood that, and the White House was fearful that if you recused yourself, the President and the First Lady would be left defenseless against Ellen Kulka or other RTC professionals who might file suit in the Madison/Whitewater case. The White House wanted you, not Ellen Kulka, to be the decisionmaker. And the documents and the testimony make this very clear. Now, let me read something to you. Let me direct your attention to a very new document that was just given to us. It had been previously edited out, and the White House later agreed we could have it. It's a memorandum dated February 28 from Neil Eggleston to 535 Harold Ickes where we get a unique insight into how they perceived your role, and, Mr. Altman, maybe you did not perceive your role this way. I am confident the White House did. Mr. ALTMAN. Senator, what's the date of it? Senator DOMENICI. I'm telling you it's after all this, but just wait until we have to hear what it says. Mr. ALTMAN. It's after I recused myself; right? Senator DOMENICI. Yes, it's February 28, but let me read it for you, because - Senator KERRY. What page? Senator DOMENICI. Let's see--of the memo that we have?