August 2, 1994 - Part 3
August 2, 1994 - Part 3
(12:50:34) Senator CAMPBELL. So that you maybe give people different advice before and after it becomes public information, Mr. FOREMAN. Yes, sir, that's very correct, possibly, depending on the circumstances. Senator CAMPBELL. I think that's all I needed to know, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Domenici. OPENING COMMENTS OF SENATOR PETE V. DOMENICI Senator DOMENICI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Josh Steiner, I want to tell you on the way over here, Senator Boxer had me in an elevator where I couldn't get out and she reminded me-she put her arms on my shoulders and she reminded me "you have a whole bunch of young children that are just like that guy." She doesn't know how many, but there's a big bunch of them, and I really don't intend, in my questions, to be offensive. I think you're in a tremendously difficult position, but I just want to tell you what's bothering me and I don't know if you can help me, but I want to lay it before you. First of all, I'm struggling mightily to try to find out really why this recusal issue was so important to the White House. You have not convinced me in your testimony, I really, as of this moment, don't understand why it was so important, except-except that it seems to me that clearly Whitewater is a whole bunch of facts, and it goes back a long time in history. And the statute of limitations has been increased one time so that it could be looked at again. Frankly, Mr. Steiner , I am assuming that it was very, very important- you used the words "White House." I will use the word 365 "President." I will use the words "his wife." I believe it was very, very important to them that this thing get over with in the best possible way, and I'm not saying that in any sense derogatorily. I mean, obviously, anybody in that White House, under those conditions would want that. But frankly, I believe that in the scheme of things, you, too, are very much aware that whether or not Roger Altman should recuse himself was a Presidential decision, not lawyer Nussbaum's decision. In fact, I believe you told us under deposition, you were asked this question: "Was the recusal regarded as a specific matter in which the President in a personal capacity was involved or general policy question?" And on page 304 of your deposition, you said recusal was and I now quote: Not regarded as a general policy question, but as a specific matter in which the President in his personal capacity was involved. You made that statement and you stand by it, don't you? Mr. STEINER. Senator, you've made a variety of points and I'd like to respond to them as best I can. Senator DOMENICI. I'm going to run out of time and frankly, I want to follow my 5 or 6 points and I hope there will be time for you to explain. But you made that statement, did you not? Mr. STEINER. I certainly did, Senator, Would you like me to explain what I meant? Senator, it might be helpful if I could just quickly-I was asked was this a policy question and in the context of that, was this a general policy matter relating to the Administration, or was this rela ted to the President in his former capacity before he became President. I think I was responding to that point. Senator DOMENICI. All right. Now, believe me, I think the President probably should have been involved in this. I think if I were the President and this situation existed, I would want Mr. Nussbaum and Mr. Ickes to brief me regularly on what was happening, and I don't think you ought to be ashamed about that. What I think happened is that all of you people in the White House decided that nobody ought to know that the President was genuinely interested in Whitewater and you got yourselves in a mess because of that. Why didn't somebody say that right up front Mr. STEINER. I want to make it clear, Senator. When I was responding to this question, I did not mean to suggest, nor do I now mean to suggest, that to my knowledge the President was in any way involved in the recusal decision. I only knew of three times where, to the best of my recollection, Treasury bad direct conversations with the White House about recusal, The first was the February 2 meeting. The second was a meeting on February 16, or thereabouts, with Mr. Stephanopoulos and 1, where he made it clear it was the wiser course of action. The third was on February 23 when Mr. Ickes made clear to me that he thought it was Mr. Altman's choice as to how be should proceed.