August 2, 1994 - Part 2
August 2, 1994 - Part 2
(11:05:15) Indeed, you didn't draw the wrong lessons. You also, later on, said, "such an incredible city that's been battling with RTC/Madison, wrote 2 pages about what's been going on, suddenly realized, I could be subpoenaed like Packwood's, and the most innocuous comments could be taken out of context." So on that subject, nothing, and you didn't destroy your diary. You left your diary. We have it. I think there is, in all of this, a very refreshing kind of truthfulness, almost innocent observation of the goings on of Washington. It, therefore, troubles me, a little bit, that you now want to dis- tance yourself to a certain degree or try to cast some nuances on it, though I'm not sure that's where you're going. I want to try to explore it a bit. There are five separate references in your two extractions to the subject of recusal. First, you say should RA recuse himself or should he stay involved. You discuss the hurdle and that's between January 24 and February 12. Then later on, between February 13 and 27, so we're spanning the period of about a month here. You then say, for weeks, we have been battling over bow RA should handle the investigation. Initially, we all felt he should recuse himself. Then you have the White House saying it was unacceptable. Then you say, at the hearing, the recusal amazingly did not come up, with a sense of relief that this great topic of recusal didn't come up. Then you say, the next day The New York Times ran a front page story. The heat was on. We spent a tortured day, which has been referred to by Senator Shelby, trying to decide if he should recuse himself Again, recusal is front and center. All of a sudden, despite all of this torture, despite all of these weeks- of discussions, despite all of the pressure, Hal Raines seems to be able le to elicit from Roger Altman what no one else could, which was a quick recusal on the telephone. Again the recusal is sort of front and center. Now, if you go into your preparation of all of the questions with Mr. Altman appearing before this Committee, why are you unwilling to recuse yourself? And he answers the question, or the suggestion was, well, I will not- what is it, play any role in the RTC's eventual decision, I will not be doing so. I will, therefore, have no role in the RTC's decisions on the matter. Next, you should still recuse yourself, why don't you? As I said, I'll have no role in the RTC's decisions on pursuing the claim. 348 These are all, these are not the actual answers; these are suggestions. But most of all Senator, the circumstances are such that I'll not be playing any role. Again, doesn't your relationship with the President and Mrs. Clinton require recusal? Answer, again being proposed, I'll not be playing any role- there., fore, there won't be any appearance of conflict. I am absolutely struggling to understand why it merited being' such a tortured process. Why there was such weeks and weeks of discussion. Why you spent days on this issue, if he isn't going to have any role, if he isn't going to make any decision, if he isn't going to be involved. Then why did it -matter whether he stayed or not? You've said here there were only two reasons for his staying, the precedent and to guarantee impartiality. How do you guarantee impartiality if you're not going to play any role? Mr. STEINER. The second point that you make, how do you guarantee impartiality if you're not going to be involved. I think Mr. Altman had said repeatedly, both to RTC and Treasury staff, that he wanted this case handled in a completely impartial, nonpolitical fashion. That's how you guarantee impartiality. Senator KERRY. I'm not sure if you're not involved and you're not playing any role, you can't know what's going on. TO guarantee impartiality, you have to make a decision. You have to say, no, you can't do that. Don't pursue this or don't pursue that. If you're genuinely leaving the investigation up to Kulka, what on earth was there to remain involved for?