August 2, 1994 - Part 1
August 2, 1994 - Part 1
(10:30:53) This suggests that you and probably others at Treasury were expecting another- extension of the statute of limitations. Is that correct? Mr. STEINER. That's correct, Senator. Senator SASSER. The President ultimately did sign a document extending the statute of limitations and you expected he would sign that. Is that a fair assessment? Mr. STEINER. Yes, sir. Senator SASSER. So your point here about Mr. Altman's recusal, if I understand you, is that all of the discussions really didn't matter that much because Congress and the President would ultimately extend the statute of limitations and Mr. Altman wouldn't be faced with an immediate decision about whether to proceed against Madison or not? Mr. STEINER. That's correct, Senator. We considered the issue to be moot. Senator SASSER. All right. Now, much has been made here about the possibility that information provided by Treasury to the White House concerning Madison might give the President's la wyers some advantage in negotiations about a tolling agreement, that is, an agreement to toll the statute of limitations relative to the Madison or potential civil suit against Madison. But if I understand you correctly, you and others at Treasury expected a further extension of the statute of limitations that would render a tolling agreement unnecessary? Mr. STEINER. That's correct, Senator Senator SASSER. Well, let me just ask you this, Mr. Steiner. If that were the case, why so much concern about this? Why the meetings about it? In other words, if you and your colleagues at Treasury expected the statute of limitations to be extended so that RTC would have additional time to make a judgment about whether or not to proceed with civil actions against Madison or not, why the meetings, why the concern about it? Mr. STEINER. Let me suggest two reasons, if I might, Senator. The first is that when this issue first came under consideration, it was not clear what action Congress might or might not take. The second, Senator, is that we were aware of the on-going confirmation bearings of Ms. Ricki Tigert, who was being considered for Chair of the FDIC. In the process of her confirmation hearings, she was being asked repeatedly to recuse herself on this subject. We anticipated that similar requests or demands would be made of Mr. Altman. We were considering the question in that light. Senator SASSER. Was there some kind of effort at Treasury to withhold the truth about the meetings and the contacts on Madison? 337 Mr. STEINER. Absolutely not. Senator SASSER. Do you, yourself, feel that these meetings and contacts were improper? Mr. STEINER. No, I do not, Senator. Senator SASSER. Why did you describe the February 2 White House meeting as you did in your diary, as a "fateful meeting"? Mr. STEINER. Well, Senator, by the time I wrote that on February 27, The New York Times had run a front page story on that meeting. And The New York Times had, as well, written a fairly strongly worded editorial denouncing that meeting. In hindsight, nearly 4 weeks after the meeting took place, I considered it fateful. Senator SASSER. Maybe it was, Let me ask you this question, Mr. DeVore, You've been in the business of being a press secretary for 20 years or longer and know .something about dealing with the press and servicing the needs of the press. Now, it was suggested here, yesterday, that perhaps the proper way to handle press inquiries on the part of the White House or the Treasury Department about Madison was simply to say " no comment." What do you think of that as a press strategy, and bad that strategy been followed, what would have been the result? Mr. DEVORE. My general philosophy is, if you're going to succeed as a flak, you need to be three things. Senator SASSER. Don't disparage that profession, Mr. DeVore.