August 1, 1994 - Part 6
August 1, 1994 - Part 6
(19:10:53) Senator KERRY. I understand Ms. HANSON. -and that was Mr. Altman's judgment to make, whether or not he could act impartially. My recommendation was based on my view that there was going to be such public clamor and political criticism, that he couldn't-that the appearance was that he couldn't be impartial Senator KERRY. But that is Ms. HANSON. -not that he, in fact, couldn't be impartial. Senator KERRY. I understand that, but that is exactly at the cen. ter of the kind of choice you make in a recusal. I mean, you're a la lawyer. You understand that appearance of a conflict is as essential to tie choice as the actual conflict. Ms. HANSON. Again, from the ethics point of view Senator KERRY. Don't you? Do you understand that? Ms. HANSON. That the appearance is as central as the conflict? Senator KERRY. Yes. Ms. HANSON. Yes, but in making that assessment, under the ethics rules, the standard is a reasonable person in possession of all the facts. Senator KERRY. As reasonable a person as you were, as reasonable a person as Secretary Bentsen was, as reasonable a person as Ms. Kulka was, and as reasonable a person as Mr. Ryan was, everyone thought there should be a recusal. I don't have enough time here, unfortunately, to pursue this, but I want to come back to something else that strikes me as really central. I wish we had a little more time to develop this, but on September 27, 1993, you told Mr. Altman what you had heard from Mr. Roelle, and on September 29, 1993, you saw Mr, Nussbaum, and talked about press leaks. On September 30, 1993, there was the Early Bird copy that came around. On October 6, 1993, there was a call from Mr. Roelle about Sue Schmidt. Then, you called the White House and talked to Cliff Sloan. That was the third notice the White House received. On October 11 or 12, 1993, there was a call to the Altman office, Jack DeVore was there talking about The New York Times. Then, there was a subsequent meeting October 14, 1993, and there was a White House meeting, and there was another White House meeting. It just strikes me that there's an incredible amount of scurrying around for a very simple thing. If, as you have said, this was confidential, it was not to be put out in any way, then it strikes me that, much as Mr. Bennett has said, it's very simple. I mean, you don't comment on these things. There's nothing to talk about, and you certainly don't sit down for meetings with Chiefs of Staff of various players and other people to discuss "even procedure," not substance, as you put it. 133 If, indeed, that procedure is a decision that belongs within the agency, the RTC, not even fundamentally, but broadly speaking given the conflict potential within Treasury, it strikes me there's an awful lot of meetings here for people to deal with the press when the whole thing is supposed to be confidential. Ms. HANsON. Sir, I only know of two meetings. Senator KERRY. You were meeting, on many occasions, within ou met, as I say, with Mr. DeVore, with the Secretary. Correct? you, made telephone calls. I mean, the whole purpose of this, I thought, was to understand bow to deal with press inquiries. Is that correct? Ms. HANsON. The whole purpose of it was to put people on notice so that they could intelligently deal with press inquiries. Senator KERRY. I notice they got a lot of notices. The only answer for those in the White House is, "This is under the RTC. it's inap propriate for us to know-we can't know anything about it. We 't know anything about it, and that's it." I 'don't understand why the people who are supposedly the subject, conceivably, of a decision the RTC made, are learning about the statute of limitations choices in front of the decisionmaker. Ms. HANsON. Are you talking about the February 2, 1994, meetin 9 Senator KERRY. That happened at the February 2, 1994, meeting. That's correct, It also happened-yes, at the February 2, 1994, meeting. Ms. HANsON. The February 2, 1994, meeting, sir, was entirely procedural.