July 29, 1994 - Part 2
July 29, 1994 - Part 2
(12:19:30) OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CAROL MOSELEY- BRAUN Senator MOSELEY BRAUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, under Senate Resolution 229, this Committee is directed to review whether improper conduct occurred regarding: One, communication between White House officials and RTC or Treasury officials regarding Whitewater or Madison Guaranty. Two, the Park Service Police investigation into the death of White House Deputy Counsel, Vincent Foster. Three, the way White House officials handled documents in Vincent Foster's office at the time of his death. At the outset, let me say, Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate myself with the remarks of Senators Bennett and Boxer regarding the Vincent Foster issue. We are not conducting an investigation into a suicide. Our investigation is only into. propriety of the investigation surrounding his tragic and untimely death. My condolences and sympathy also go out to his wife and family. This is no doubt a very painful time for them, and it's probably more painful to them that this matter has not yet been put to rest, However, we do have an obligation, nonetheless, to the public to ensure that no untoward or inappropriate activities occurred that would reflect on the remaining issues before this Committee. The first part of this hearing, I believe, will rightfully look into the process by which that investigation took place. What this means, therefore, Mr. President, is that at least in part, we are still dealing with the legacy of the savings and loans crisis. I was not in the Senate in the 1980's as that crisis exploded onto the scene. Like every Illinoisan, and I imagine every person in the country, I watched it develop with horror. It made me and my service here determined everything I could to prevent anything similar from ever happening again and to see that everything possible was done to minimize the public cost of completing the resolution of the savings and loan debacle. That is why, along with Senator Murray and a number of others on this Committee, I joined in insisting that a final taxpayer payment to the Resolution Trust Corporation include a wide variety of management and other reforms designed to bring more order and discipline to the RTC and to improve its efficiency. It is most important for us to protect the public interest in the final stages of the savings and loan issue and to ensure the integrity of the process in which that resolution occurs. Madison Guaranty is one of the thousands of savings and loan failures that 40 formed that crisis. It cost the taxpayers $60 million to make good the Federal Government's deposit insurance obligation to the Madison depositors. That is a very large amount of money, It is, however, chilling for us to remember what the savings and loan crisis cost each American. The Madison failure alone represents less than 5/100 of I percent of the $125 billion we are spending to resolve the savings and loan failure debacle overall. Madison is not, of course, the only savings and loan worthy of the attention of this Committee. There are many billion dollars- plus failures that deserve and need our attention. These hearings that are beginning today, however, involve only the Madison situation. The reason for that, Mr. Chairman, is all too obvious. It is because the President of the United States before be became President was involved in a real estate partnership with Madison's then CEO. The President was not a stockholder in Madison. He was not an officer of Madison. He was not a director of Madison, but he did have a tangential relationship to Madison. I believe that the media has done its job in bringing the President's connection to a failed savings and loan to the attention of the American public. The Special Counsel, the Resolution Trust Corporation, the Banking Committee of the House, and this Committee are now doing our jobs. We are all investigating matters that in some way relate to Madison or its fallout, These investigations are time- consuming and they are expensive. By the time all is said and done it is very possible that the Federal Government will windup spending as much money investigating Madison and the real estate partnership commonly known as Whitewater, as it cost the Federal Government to close Madison down in the first place. I support and appreciate the public demand for careful review of this issue, which is why I supported the appointment of Special Counsel, Also, Mr. Chairman, at this point I'd like to congratulate you for the careful attention that you have given to this matter and the kind of thoroughness of your persistence in following this through. Given that the heart of the matter before the Special Counsel involves reviewing a time before the President took office, I think that the obligation of Congress now is to let the Special Counsel do his work. This Congress should, therefore, not bold bearings on matters which are the subject of open investigations by the Special Counsel. The judgment of the Senate, as expressed in S. Res. 229, is entirely correct, In fact-, I would make the point even more strongly. Congress must not take actions that can undermine the Special Counsel's ability to do his job. The subject matters before the Committee today, however, relate directly to the times since January 29, 1993, when Governor Clinton became President Clinton. They are clearly appropriate for Congressional hearings. They clearly relate to the performance of the President and of public officials of the White House, and of a number of governmental departments and agencies. This Committee will meet its responsibilities in these areas. The Committee has already conducted 37 depositions and reviewed over 10,000 pages of documents, I hope this Committee's bearings will meet the public's expectations for a fair and balanced review of the matters before us.