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August 4, 1994 - Part 7
(16:00:24) The next communication I know about between White House and Treasury officials on this subject occurred on October 14, 1993, On that day, I and several of my colleagues met with officials from the Treasury Department at the White House to discuss additional press inquiries. This meeting took place after Jack DeVore, a press official at the Treasury Department, had received a call from Jeff Gerth of The New York Times about the alleged criminal referrals,. including a suggestion that the referrals were being "bottled up " in Washington, rather than going to the U.S. Attorney's office in Little Rock. My understanding was that Mr. DeVore was seeking guidance on how to respond to the press inquiry. He told us that he had checked and found that the referrals had initially been sent Washington, but that, well before the reporter inquired, they had, been forwarded to the U.S. Attorney's office. Mr. DeVore wished to 359 confirm these facts to the reporter before an incorrect story was written on the subject. He indicated it was standard practice for the RTC to confirm the existence of a criminal referral. I expressed some surprise at this and suggested that Mr. DeVore, rather than confirming the existence of the referrals, should simply respond to the reporter by stating that whatever had been sent from the RTC had been forwarded to the U.S. Attorney's office prior to the reporter's inquiry. No one discussed or suggested that any action should be taken to try to influence the matters that were the subject of the referrals. To my knowledge, other than my checking campaign records with regard to one of the questions the reporter was asking, nothing further was done after October 14, other than Mr. DeVore responding to the reporter's inquiry. In early December 1993, 1 received faxes from two Treasury Department officials of press-generated Freedom of Information Act requests for Madison documents. These came to me without comment, and I took no action in response to them. The final so-called Whitewater-Treasury contact in which I was involved occurred sometime in February 1994, and again was precipitated by a press inquiry: A reporter contacted the press office at the Treasury Department about a meeting between White House and Treasury officials at which there was a briefing on the RTC civil statute of limitations. The reporter said that she understood that, at the meeting, a White I-louse official attempted to pressure the Treasury Department to give a similar briefing to the private attorneys involved in the matter. The press inquiry to the Treasury Department was passed along to the White House press off-lee who passed it along to me. Since I had not attended any White House-Treasury meeting, I called Roger Altman, whom the reporter indicated had attended the meeting, and asked him whether such a meeting had occurred and, if so, what had happened. Mr. Altman told me there was a meeting in early February at which he and other Treasury officials briefed White House officials on the statute of limitations issue. Mr. Altman told me that a White House official had asked him whether a similar briefing would be given to the private attorneys in the matter. Mr. Altman said that he had checked with an RTC attorney who indicated such a briefing would be given at an appropriate time but not now. Mr. Altman told me that no one at the meeting instructed him to do anything. I advised Mr. Altman to respond to the press inquiry accordingly, and I took no further action. I have now informed this Committee of all White House--Treasury Department communications in which I was involved. I have also produced my contemporaneous handwritten notes and memoranda relating to these matters, which I believe fully reflect what I have just recounted. Before I conclude, Mr. Chairman, let me restate as clearly as I can: None of these conversations, nor any other action that I am aware of, involved any effort by anybody to influence the conduct of any investigation. They were discussions advising us of press inquiries and discussions about how to respond to them. Nothing improper occurred. I will be happy to answer any questions the Committee may have, 360 GEORGE R. STEPHANOPOULOS, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT FOR POLICY AND STRATEGY, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. STEPHANOPOULOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, my name is, George Stephanopoulos and I serve as Senior Policy Advisor to the President. My testimony concerning matters which are the subject of these hearings will focus mainly on two brief telephone conversations, both of which occurred on February 25th. The first occurred with Josh Steiner, Treasury Chief of Staff, concerning Roger Altman's decision to announce his recusal from decisions concerning Madison Guaranty. Mr. Steiner was my regular point of contact at Treasury for obtaining information that affected Administration policy. In the course of that conversation, I asked about the decision to hire former U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, Jay Stephens-a vocal, persistent and public political opponent of the President-to handle the RTC inquiry of Madison. I was puzzled at how he could be hired, given his obvious inability to be impartial, and I asked how that decision was made.
August 4, 1994 - Part 7
(16:05:49) As I have said publicly in the past, I did blow off steam in that conversation, based on my belief that Mr. Stephens had and has a conflict of interest, that he could not be an impartial investigator. Mr. Steiner informed me that the decision had been made by an independent board. That ended the conversation. I took no further action. I believe later that day I had a conversation with Harold Ickes and Roger Altman during which the subject of his recusal was discussed, specifically, as I recall, that he had informed a New York Times editor that he had decided to recuse himself. I was concerned that because of the manner in which he had chosen to announce his decision, the Administration would, for a time, be maintaining inconsistent public positions on this issue. I suggested that, as a courtesy to the President, Mr. Altman write a personal note explaining his decision. I took no further action concerning this issue. Thank you very much. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Podesta, why don't you give us your statement now. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Stephanopoulos. JOHN D. PODESTA, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND WHITE HOUSE STAFF SECRETARY, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. PODESTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, my name is John Podesta. I am an Assistant to the President and White House Staff Secretary, a position I have held since inauguration day, January 20, 1993. My principal duties involve managing the paper flow going to and from the President. Earlier in my career, I spent more than 9 years on the staff of two Senate Committees-as Counsel to the Judiciary Committee and for more than a year as Chief Counsel to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry. As a result of my Capitol Hill experience, I have from time to time been asked at the White 361 House to work on legislative and congressional matters. It is in this context that my connection to the matter before this Committee took place. On or perhaps just before February 14, 1994, 1 was asked by Mack McLarty and Pat Griffin, the Director of White House Legislative Affairs, to work on upcoming hearings involving RTC matters. Mr. Griffin bad recently joined the White House staff and was concentrating his time and attention on passage of the President's legislative program, principally Health Care reform. In anticipation of upcoming RTC Oversight Board hearings, we expected questions on Madison Guaranty to be raised. My task, as I saw it, was to analyze what was likely to take place at the hearings and to recommend ways to ensure that the hearings were fair and balanced. This assignment was in addition to my regular duties, and did not consume the majority of my time. As best as I can recall, this is a summary of what occurred over the following days. On February 15, 1 met with Mike Levy, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and discussed the expected RTC Oversight Board hearing in the Senate Banking Committee. Mr. Levy briefed me on the composition and functions of the RTC Oversight Board. During the remainder of that week, Mr. Levy and I had several telephone conversations concerning the hearing. We never discussed the underlying investigation of Madison, nor did I discuss that subject with anyone else at Treasury or the RTC. Mr. Levy and I did briefly discuss the fact that Roger Altman would need to be prepared to answer questions about recusal in light of the fact that Ricki Tigert, our nominee to chair the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, had been pressured on recusal during her confirmation hearings. I did not, try in any way to influence the substance of Mr. Altman's answer on the subject of recusal. My discussion with Mr. Levy only went to the fact that Mr. Altman needed to be prepared to respond to questions on this subject. In the several days before the hearing, I also spoke by telephone on two or three occasions to Josh Steiner, Secretary Bentsen's Chief of Staff. At this time it is difficult for me to separate these conversations or to remember them with precision. I believe I initiated the first call to ask Mr. Steiner to encourage Secretary Bentsen to take a prominent role at the hearing. Again, this was to ensure that the hearing was broadly focused on our Administration's overall handling of the S&L cleanup and to contrast that record with the record of previous Administrations. About this time I became aware that Mr. Altman had met on February 2 with White House staff. I believe I raised with Mr. Steiner the fact that Mr. Altman probably would be asked a question about whether he had consulted with the White House on the Madison matter, and that he needed to be able to discuss the February 2 meeting in response to such a question. I did not try to influence the substance of Mr. Altman's response. Before the hearing, Mr. Steiner also told me that Mr. Altman planned to put in his opening statement the fact that he intended to leave the RTC when Vacancy Act term expired at the end of March.
The Cuban Crisis
Same as catalog #520372 The Cuban Crisis The United States' answer to what Adlai Stevenson calls in the United Nations: "Soviet Blackmail" is a quarantine of all offensive weapons being shipped from Russia to the island fortress. The U.S. throws up a steel fence, prepared to stop any vessel carrying materials of war. Adlai Stevenson speaking to United Nations (natural audio of speech). Aerial views of ships at sea, battleships, aircraft carriers, etc. In Cuba itself 100,000 men are on emergency orders as they have been during past invasion scares. The waterfront in Havana and along other parts of the coast bristle with gun emplacements as the Cuban regime waits to see what their Kremlin bosses were to do. Cuban soldiers in streets. Patriotic rallies, women carry signs. Fidel Castro seen at rally. The United States arrived at the decision after studying reconnaissance photographs made with high-powered cameras (surveillance ?). Men assemble large camera onto plane, and clean lens. Aerial of plane in flight. Interior shot of camera operator. Photos of missile site and surface to air missile depot. In the greatest display of hemisphere solidarity since World War II the OAS unanimously endorses the actions of the United States. Cuba is absent, empty chair. Sec. of State Dean Rusk ? Meanwhile, the U.S. continues to reinforce its Cuban base at Guantanamo Bay. Air force plane on tarmac, marines exit plane carrying duffle bags. Marines lined up for group photo. Pan down United Nations building. The United States goes to the UN Security Council for a resolution calling for a withdrawal of all offensive weapons from Cuba after President Kennedy refuses to withdraw our arms blockade before the bases are demolished. Adlai Stevenson speaking to United Nations.