July 29, 1994 - Part 1
July 29, 1994 - Part 1
(10:21:48) The evidence will show that at the beginning of this year, the White House was "paralyzed" by Whitewater. "Paralyzed" is not my word. It's the word of Mrs, Clinton's Chief of Staff, as she warned Roger Altman around the New Year that Whitewater threatened to bring Administration initiatives to a halt. It's a message which rang . Roger Altman's cars in January as he confronted yet another investigation into Madison and Whitewaterthe RTC's investigation centering on a possible civil case, Mr. Chairman, in January, the RTC was faced with three choices on Madison and the Clintons: The RTC could file a case by February 28; it could seek a so- called tolling agreement from the private parties, including the Clintons, that would extend the limitations deadline into the future; or it could let the limitations period expire without any case being filed. On January 11 and January 25, several colleagues and I wrote to Mr. Altman urging him, to take appropriate steps to preserve the ' rights by seeking voluntary tolling agreements from all taxpayers I private parties. We insisted that a decision be made before the statute of limitations expired, But the problem was the final decisionmaker, Roger Altman. Altman should have recused himself-removed himself entirely from the Madison case-because of his personal and political relationships with the Clintons. Many Members of Congress thought so. The General Counsel of the RTC thought so, Members of Altman's own staff thought so. Jean Hanson, the General Counsel of Treasury, actually told him so. And the Treasury Secretary himself, Lloyd Bentsen, agreed. But, Mr. Chairman, there was a more compelling reason. Roger Altman knew that his impartiality was fatally compromised when Mrs. Clinton's Chief of Staff unmistakably informed him that the First Lady urgently wanted the Whitewater problem to be "solved." The picture is this: As he approaches the deadline for decision in the highly publicized Whitewater investigation affecting his friends and patrons, the President and the First Lady, Roger Altman, the decisionmaker, is told that the First Lady desperately wants the paralysis of Whitewater to end. Is there any doubt that Mr. Altman labored under an intense and clear and actual conflict of interest? The evidence will show that Mr. Altman understood this actual conflict of interest. He and his Treasury colleagues discussed the fact that filing, suit against the Clintons would be awkward. Mr. Altman's inclination going into the February 2 meeting at the White House was to, in fact, remove himself entirely from the case. Why did he change his mind? As Mr. Cutler himself has admitted, strong comments by White House personnel in this meeting "may have influenced Mr. Altman's decision on February 3 to defer recusal." That's an understatement. As Altman's former aide and Treasury Chief of Staff, Josh Steiner, put it in his diary-a diary written not to prepare for public testimony but at the time of events, when there's no motive to lie-Altman was under "intense pressure" from the White House. Sworn testimony from several witnesses establishes beyond a doubt that the reason the White House urged Altman to stay on the case was the fear that the RTC General Counsel who would take over the decision would be too "tough" on the Clintons. Mr. Altman told those assembled at the White House on February 2 that he would sleep on the recusal decision. He must have had a restless night because even now the full picture of the pressure placed on Altman has not emerged. But we do know from sworn testimony that Altman reversed himself to keep the White House-to use his word---"happy." What are we to make of this? Mr. Cutler concedes-as he mustthat the White House should not have influenced the recusal decision. But he argues "no harm, no foul," because in the end Altman was never faced with the need to participate in a decision about whether or not to bring an RTC case against Madison. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cutler well knows that the only reason that the White House plan to have Mr. Altman control the decision did not succeed was congressional action unforeseen by the White House on February 2. Because it wasn't until February 11 that Congress gave the RTC Madison investigation a new lease on life when we extended the statute of limitations until the end of 1995. 1 have no doubt that if the unexpected congressional extension had not occurred, the White House effort would have triumphed. But there's an even more important fact-a crucial fact-about the February 2 White House meeting that has not been disclosed until now. This fact demolishes the Cutler conclusion that these White House meetings are forgivable. It is not true, as Mr. Cutler said, that Altman merely imparted public information to the White House. Sworn testimony by Deputy White House Chief of Staff, Harold Ickes, establishes that at the February 2 meeting Altman revealed more than legal procedure: Ickes testifies that he asked Altman about "the progress of the inquiry being conducted by the RTC." Ickes further testifies that Altman answered by telling the White House: "That it was his view, based on information from his sources-and I assumed one of them was the General Counsel of the RTC-that the investigation was going to take a longer period of time to conclude." According to Ickes, Altman said that it was: "Unlikely that the investigation could be completed and a recommendation made by 8 the General Counsel prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations."